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INTRODUCTION

Article I, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution provides
1
litigants the right to unilaterally request a jury trial in civil cases.
2
3
This right, however, is not absolute. Both the plain language and
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of the constitutional
guarantee recognize a difference between legal and equitable
4
causes of action. The former may be submitted to a jury while the
5
latter may not.
Recently, in United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen
Nutrition & Equipment, LLC, the Minnesota Supreme Court
addressed whether a cause of action for the recovery of attorney’s
6
fees bargained for in an indemnity contract is legal or equitable.
7
In a matter of first impression, the court concluded that this type
8
The reasoning advanced is not
of claim is legal in nature.
controversial. However, it places creditors in a difficult position
moving forward. Most notably, it means that in actions seeking to
enforce loan agreements that include attorney fee provisions,
debtors may request a jury determination as to the amount of
attorney’s fees owed. Whether this is a positive or negative has yet
9
to be determined. It could be beneficial for creditors if juries are
sympathetic to their case. However, it is more likely to be viewed
negatively. Given that there has not been sufficient time to

1. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4.
2. Mary F. Torpey, Right to Civil Jury Trial—“Looking Straight at Things”: State
Constitution Does Not Guarantee Right to Jury Trial in Promissory Estoppel Case. Olson v.
Synergistic Technologies Business Systems, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. 2001), 33
RUTGERS L.J. 1231, 1235 (2002).
3. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4 (applying only to cases “at law”).
4. Torpey, supra note 2, at 1235.
5. Id.
6. 813 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 2012). An indemnity contract is “[a] contract
whereby one agrees to save another from the legal consequences of the conduct of
one of the parties or some other person.” BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (3d
ed. 1969); see also 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.10(3), at 402 (2d ed.
1993); infra note 139. The indemnity contract at issue in United Prairie Bank
required the debtors, the Haugens and Haugen Nutrition & Equipment, LLC, to
reimburse United Prairie Bank if it incurred attorney’s fees in any action for the
protection or enforcement of its security interests. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d
at 52.
7. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 64 (Dietzen, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 57 (majority opinion).
9. See Seth Leventhal, Judge or Jury: Who’s Better to Decide the Amount of
an Award of Attorneys’ Fees? (Aug. 2, 2012) (on file with the author).
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10

compile data, creditors would be well served to pay close attention
to the result reached in United Prairie Bank.
This article begins by analyzing the history of the civil right to
11
a jury trial. It then turns to an examination of United Prairie Bank
12
in relation to its historical backdrop. It critiques the Minnesota
13
Supreme Court’s analysis and concludes with a discussion about
14
the lesson to be learned as a result of United Prairie Bank. The
lesson is that until there is evidence indicating how juries award
fees, Minnesota creditors are advised to include provisions in loan
agreements stating that contractual attorney fee disputes shall be
decided by the court and not by a jury.
II. HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
A.

From the Magna Carta to the Bill of Rights

The origins of the civil right to a jury trial can be traced to the
Magna Carta, which was signed at Runnymede by King John on
15
June 15, 1215. It guaranteed “no freeman would be disseized,
dispossessed, or imprisoned except by judgment of his peers or by
16
the ‘laws of the land.’” The provision proved popular, and by the
early part of the seventeenth century it was a primary tenet of
17
English liberty.
The practice also proved well suited for the
American colonies, which began to guarantee the right as early as
18
1606.
While the colonies were quick to provide the right,
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See infra Part IV.C–D.
15. Richard S. Arnold, Trial By Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve
in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 13 (1993). Contra Charles W. Wolfram, The
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 653 n.44
(1973) (citing commentary for the proposition that the framers of the United
States Constitution agreed the civil right to a jury trial was traceable to the Magna
Carta but “[h]istorians no longer accept [this] pedigree”).
16. Arnold, supra note 15, at 13; see also Wolfram, supra note 15, at 653.
17. Arnold, supra note 15, at 13.
18. Id. (“The 1606 Charter to the Virginia Company incorporated the right to
a jury trial, and by 1624 all trials in Virginia, both civil and criminal, were by jury.
In 1628, the Massachusetts Bay Colony introduced jury trials, and the right to a
jury trial was codified in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties by 1641. The Colony
of West New Jersey implemented trial by jury in 1677, as did New Hampshire in
1680 and Pennsylvania in 1682, under William Penn. Massachusetts (1641),
Rhode Island (1647), New Jersey (1683), South Carolina (1712), and Delaware
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inclusion in the United States Constitution was more contentious.
As originally drafted, the United States Constitution did not
19
include any provision guaranteeing the civil right to a jury trial.
In fact, the issue was only briefly discussed during the
20
Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. Each time the
right to a jury trial was addressed, it produced “conflicting
21
reactions.” Those in favor of such a provision were concerned
22
about corrupt judges and also safeguarding the right that had
23
been established in the colonies.
Those opposed argued that
practices among the states varied so greatly that it would be
24
The
impossible to adopt language satisfactory to every state.
opponents prevailed at the Constitutional Convention, but their
success was short-lived.
After the United States Constitution was signed and delivered
to the Continental Congress on September 17, 1787, the country
became divided over the Drafters’ failure to provide American
25
citizens with a Bill of Rights.
At the center of this dispute—
26
possibly even precipitating it —was the failure to guarantee the
27
civil right to a jury trial. Antifederalists, who supported a Bill of
Rights, raised several concerns in this regard. They primarily
believed that without the right, judgment debtors would be at the
mercy of federal judges, who were more likely to be of the same
28
social class as judgment creditors.
Antifederalist Judge Samuel
Byran stated that judges are likely to have
a bias towards those of their own rank and dignity; for it is
not to be expected, that the few should be attentive to the
rights of the many. [The civil right to a jury trial]
(1727) adopted the Magna Charta’s specific language.”). Commentators have
observed that the right was “probably the only one universally secured by the first
American constitutions.” Wolfram, supra note 15, at 655.
19. Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving
Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 185 (2000).
20. Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 289, 293–94 (1966) (noting the Framers only debated the issue twice
during the entire Constitutional Convention); Wolfram, supra note 15, at 657–61.
21. Henderson, supra note 20, at 293–94.
22. Id. at 293.
23. Id.; Moses, supra note 19, at 185. The argument was that the failure to
guarantee the right essentially meant it had been abolished.
24. Moses, supra note 19, at 186.
25. Henderson, supra note 20, at 295.
26. Id. at 295; Wolfram, supra note 15, at 657.
27. Henderson, supra note 20, at 295.
28. Moses, supra note 19, at 186.
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therefore preserves in the hands of the people, that share
which they ought to have in the administration of justice,
and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful
29
and wealthy citizens.
Beyond protecting judgment debtors, Antifederalists were also
30
concerned about granting federal judges unregulated power.
These arguments had significant appeal and ultimately resulted in
the adoption of the Seventh Amendment to the United States
31
Constitution.
The Seventh Amendment guarantees:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
32
than according to the rules of the common law.
33
The provision is noticeably vague as to what it actually provides.
This appears to be in response to the concerns of Federalists who
argued it would be difficult to draft language satisfactory to every
34
state. It has been observed that a more expansive provision would
35
not have survived the political process. The result of the vague
36
language is that courts have delineated the scope of the right.
29. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Wolfram, supra note 15, at 695–96 (quoting
Letters of Centinel, No. II, FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA AND
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787–1788, at 584 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick
D. Stone eds., 1888))).
30. Id. (“Other arguments advanced by the antifederalists in favor of civil jury
trials included the need to guard against unwise legislation, presumably by jury
nullification, the need to overturn the practices of courts of vice-admiralty, by
which the British had imposed non-jury proceedings on the colonists, the
protection of the interests of private citizens against the government, and the
protection of individuals against overbearing and oppressive judges.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Wolfram, supra note 15, at 670–71)).
31. Moses, supra note 19, at 186; see Henderson, supra note 20, at 298–99.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
33. Moses, supra note 19, at 186; Wolfram, supra note 15, at 639 (noting the
“[S]eventh [A]mendment has presented its full share of interpretive and logical
difficulties”). See Henderson, supra note 20, for a further discussion of the
Seventh Amendment’s vague language.
34. Henderson, supra note 20, at 294. Federalists were also concerned that it
“would be difficult to draft constitutional language that would distinguish
intelligently between those cases in which a jury would be appropriate and those
in which it would not.” Wolfram, supra note 15, at 663.
35. Moses, supra note 19, at 186.
36. Id. The focus of this article is the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
interpretation of article I, section 4. It includes some discussion of federal
precedent, but centers on how Minnesota has interpreted its provision. See
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A Tale of Two Constitutions? Minnesota’s Unique Story
37

Minnesota drafted its constitution in 1857 and achieved
38
It framed a constitution in the shadows of
statehood in 1858.
both the United States Constitution and the constitutions of the
39
previously admitted states. Constitutional debates indicate that
the framers were keenly aware of this fact and adopted a
40
constitution individually tailored to Minnesota. One of the state’s
most obvious departures from its federal counterpart is discernible
Moses, supra note 19, at 187–217, for a detailed discussion of federal jurisprudence
regarding the Seventh Amendment.
37. MARY JANE MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION 1 (2002).
Minnesota’s drafting story is interesting in and of itself. Republicans and
Democrats vehemently disagreed with one another over the scope and text of
Minnesota’s constitution and, as a result, only met twice during the entire
Constitutional Convention. Id. Rather than sorting out their differences, the
parties separated and drafted their own documents.
Id.
Although the
disagreement was significant, the parties’ final products were nearly identical. Id.
at 1–2. A local newspaper published each party’s proceedings and because the
drafting process was somewhat public, the parties made concessions to one
another throughout. Id. at 2. The compromise committee was able to complete
its work with relatively minor difficulties. Id. Some will say that because the
Republicans and Democrats drafted separate documents, Minnesota actually has
two constitutions. Id. at 6. Others disagree with this assertion claiming the only
real difference is punctuation. Id.
38. Id. at 6 (“Minnesota became the thirty-second state in 1858.”).
39. 7 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CRIMINAL
LAW & PROCEDURE § 1.4 (4th ed. 2012). The framers of the Minnesota
Constitution were also operating in the shadows of the Northwest Ordinance,
which was enacted by the First Congress under the United States Constitution.
WILLIAM ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION 9 (1921). The
ordinance, which applied to a region that included Minnesota, was simple and
provided for a temporary government over the region, even though the territory
that was to be Minnesota was uninhabited by people of European ancestry. Id.
Relevant to this article is the fact that the Northwest Ordinance guaranteed the
civil right to a jury trial. Id. at 10; MORRISON, supra note 37, at 4; Wolfram, supra
note 15, at 656.
40. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 1:4. The 1857 Constitution was not
novel by any means, but contrary to some assertions, neither was it the product of
cutting and pasting “provisions from the constitutions of other states.” ANDERSON,
supra note 39, at 4. At least one commentator has stated:
It is more nearly in conformity with the facts to say that from the first day
that English-speaking white men set foot in the Northwest territory a
course of events was begun which in the fullness of time dictated to the
people of Minnesota some of the most important clauses in their
constitution. Furthermore, the experiences of the pioneers under the
various territorial governments which succeeded each other in the
control of the Minnesota country, constituted a very solid education in
the fundamentals of administration in a new and undeveloped country.
Id.
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in its first article, which provides Minnesota’s Bill of Rights.
42
Beyond organization, the language used is also different.
This is particularly apparent in examining article I, section 4, which
43
guarantees the civil right to a jury trial.
The provision, in
pertinent part, provides: “The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the
44
amount in controversy.” The most apparent difference between
this provision and the Seventh Amendment is that Minnesota does
not require a minimum amount in controversy for the right to
45
attach. While the difference in language is noteworthy, the more
significant distinction is the way courts interpret the provisions. In
State v. Hamm, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
It is important to remember that we sit today in our role
as the highest court of the State of Minnesota interpreting
our own constitution, framed and ratified by the people of
this state. While a decision of the United States Supreme
Court interpreting an identical provision of the federal
Constitution may be persuasive, it should not be
automatically followed or our separate constitution will be
46
of little value.
These are powerful words that have real importance. Beyond
ensuring that the state has a unique identity, the Seventh
Amendment has not been incorporated into the Due Process
47
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, federal
41. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 1:4. This, of course, is different from
the United States Constitution, which states the Bill of Rights in its amendments.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4.
45. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
46. 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 1988).
47. Wolfram, supra note 15, at 645–46; James L. “Larry” Wright & M. Matthew
Williams, Remember the Alamo: The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on Jury Awards, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449, 466
(2004). The doctrine of incorporation refers to the application of the Bill of
Rights to state governments. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416 (8th ed. 2010). As initially interpreted, the Bill of Rights
did not apply to the states. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247
(1833). However, through the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, namely
the Due Process Clause, the United States Supreme Court has applied many of the
provisions to the states. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra. This means that by infringing
these provisions, state governments violate the United States Constitution. Id.
This also means that state governments do not run afoul of the United States
Constitution when violating provisions that have not been incorporated. Id. As
mentioned, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is one of the few
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precedent interpreting the Seventh Amendment is merely
persuasive authority in Minnesota. As a result, the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s interpretation of article I, section 4 is critical to
understanding the constitutional right in Minnesota state courts.
C.

The Evolution of the Civil Right to a Jury Trial in Minnesota

The intention of the Drafters in adopting article I, section 4 of
48
the Minnesota Constitution “was clearly not to create a new right.”
Rather, the intention was “to preserve an old [right] against
49
interference by the legislature.” In Whallon v. Bancroft, one of the
50
first cases to interpret the constitutional guarantee, the court
51
First, it
noted definitively that it has a twofold effect.
“recognize[s] the right of trial by jury as it existed in the Territory
of Minnesota at the time of the adoption of the State
52
Constitution.”
Second, it recognizes that this right is “to
53
In considering the
continue . . . unimpaired and inviolate.”
article I, section 4 right to a jury trial, Minnesota courts generally
54
begin their analysis by reciting this language.
The Whallon twofold effect recognizes a difference between
55
legal and equitable causes of action. At the time the Minnesota
Constitution was adopted, a party was entitled to exercise the right
56
only if the action was legal in nature. This interpretation stems
provisions that has not been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 416–17.
48. ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 159.
49. Id.
50. Torpey, supra note 2, at 1234.
51. 4 Minn. 109, 113 (1860).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Onvoy, Inc. v. Allete, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Minn. 2007);
Abraham v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 2002); Olson v.
Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. 2001); Smith v.
Bailen, 258 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Minn. 1977); Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn.
409, 433, 35 N.W.2d 719, 734 (1949); Hawley v. Wallace, 137 Minn. 183, 187, 163
N.W. 127, 129 (1917); Morton Brick & Tile Co. v. Sodergren, 130 Minn. 252, 254,
153 N.W. 527, 528 (1915); In re Peters, 119 Minn. 96, 101–02, 137 N.W. 390, 392
(1912); State ex rel. Styve v. Dist. Judge of Tenth Judicial Dist., 85 Minn. 215, 217–
18, 88 N.W. 742, 743 (1902); Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196,
209, 68 N.W. 53, 54–55 (1896); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 47 Minn. 451, 452–53, 50
N.W. 598, 599 (1891).
55. Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 349; Olson, 628 N.W.2d at 154; Morton, 130 Minn.
at 254, 153 N.W. at 528; Bond v. Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 43–44, 63 N.W. 3, 3–4
(1895); Torpey, supra note 2, at 1235.
56. Torpey, supra note 2, at 1235.
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not only from tradition but also from the plain language of the
57
constitutional guarantee, as it extends only to cases “at law.”
Minnesota authority has not elaborated thoroughly on why there is
a difference between legal and equitable causes of actions.
However, scholars examining the Seventh Amendment note the
distinction stems from the common law separation of courts of law
58
and courts of equity. Even though the courts have merged, both
59
federal and state courts continue this historical separation.
The post-merger distinction can be problematic, especially
60
when the cause of action involves both legal and equitable issues.
In this situation, the legal issues may be submitted to the jury, while
61
the equitable issues remain within discretion of the trial court.
The same is true where a plaintiff brings forth a legal claim and the
62
defendant’s counterclaim seeks equitable relief. However, simply
because a cause of action raises a legal issue does not necessarily
63
mean a party is entitled to a jury trial. Where a cause of action is
primarily equitable in nature but also includes incidental legal
64
relief, neither party is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.
For example, in Koeper the Minnesota Supreme Court found the
plaintiff’s primary goal in bringing the action was to enjoin the
65
defendant from overflowing water onto the plaintiff’s land. The
plaintiff’s request for incidental damages was not sufficient to deem
66
the action legal in nature. Similarly, in Indianhead Trucking the
court found that the plaintiff brought suit for specific performance,
and the fact that the action sought incidental damages was not
67
sufficient to warrant a jury trial.
57.
58.

See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4.
20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 98 (2d ed. 2012).
59. Id.
60. MORRISON, supra note 37, at 42.
61. Morton Brick & Tile Co. v. Sodergren, 130 Minn. 252, 254–55, 153 N.W.
527, 528 (1915).
62. See Crosby v. Scott-Graff Lumber Co., 93 Minn. 475, 478–79, 101 N.W.
610, 611 (1904).
63. See Indianhead Trucking Line, Inc. v. Hvidsten Transp., Inc., 268 Minn.
176, 192–93, 128 N.W.2d 334, 346 (1964); Koeper v. Town of Louisville, 109 Minn.
519, 521–23, 124 N.W. 218, 218–19 (1910); Lace v. Fixen, 39 Minn. 46, 48–49, 38
N.W. 762, 763 (1888).
64. See Indianhead Trucking, 268 Minn. at 194, 128 N.W.2d at 357; Koeper, 109
Minn. at 522, 124 N.W. at 218.
65. 109 Minn. at 522–23, 124 N.W. at 219.
66. Id. at 522–23, 124 N.W. at 219.
67. 268 Minn. at 192–94, 128 N.W.2d at 346–47.
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Courts initially determined whether a claim was legal or
68
Over time,
equitable solely by the language in the complaint.
however, courts acknowledged that the complaint alone was too
narrow and found that the civil right to a jury trial depended on
the “nature and character of the controversy, determined from all
69
the pleadings.”
Examining the “nature and character of the
controversy” requires courts to ask whether the type of action at
issue would have been properly submitted to a jury when the
70
Minnesota Constitution was adopted. The practice of reviewing
the type of action has proven to be effective in resolving modern
disputes because of the inherent difficulties of “analyz[ing] current
71
practice and pleading in the context of 1850’s jurisprudence.” It
is also effective as it responds to forms of relief that did not enter
72
Minnesota’s legal arena until the twentieth century.
To make the determination of whether a cause of action is
legal or equitable, the Minnesota Supreme Court has articulated a
73
two-pronged test. In Abraham, it stated that courts must look at
74
the “nature and character of the controversy” (i.e., the substantive
75
nature of the claim) and also the “theory for relief.” This is the
analysis used by the Minnesota Supreme Court in United Prairie
76
Bank.
68. See Williams v. Howes, 137 Minn. 462, 463, 162 N.W. 1049, 1049 (1917)
(“The question of the character of the action is determined solely by the
complaint.”); Morton Brick & Tile Co. v. Sodergren, 130 Minn. 252, 255, 153 N.W.
527, 528 (1915) (examining the complaint to determine whether the action was
equitable in nature); Shipley v. Belduc, 93 Minn. 414, 416, 101 N.W. 952, 953
(1904) (“The decisive test whether an action is triable to the court or to a jury is to
be determined upon an examination of the complaint . . . .”); Bond v. Welcome,
61 Minn. 43, 44, 63 N.W. 3, 4 (1895) (“The pleadings in the case at bar, especially
the answer, clearly disclose a case which is one of equitable cognizance, to be tried
in the methods pertaining to courts of equity. We do not, however, rest our
decision in this case upon the proposition that the pleadings show that the action
is an equitable one, but upon the ground that the complaint discloses it . . . .”).
But see Fair v. Stickney Farm Co., 35 Minn. 380, 381, 29 N.W. 49, 49–50 (1886)
(examining the complaint and answer to determine whether the action was
equitable in nature).
69. Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 326, 126 N.W.2d 766, 768 (1964).
70. Abraham v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. 2002)
(referring directly to cases at law).
71. Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 149 (Minn.
2001).
72. Id.
73. See Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 350–53.
74. Id. at 350
75. Id. at 353.
76. United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip.,
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III. THE UNITED PRAIRIE BANK DECISION
A.

Factual Background

In 2002, Defendants Leland Haugen and Ilene Haugen began
to experience financial difficulties in connection with their feed
77
mill business.
Plaintiff United Prairie Bank agreed to provide
78
relief to the Haugens by refinancing their debt obligations. The
parties agreed to a plan that transferred some of the Haugens’
assets to a third party and created a new entity, Haugen Nutrition &
79
Equipment, LLC (“HNE”), to purchase those assets.
To
effectuate the latter transfer, the Haugens borrowed $323,484.82,
which was secured by commercial security agreements, personal
80
guarantees, and a mortgage. Each security entitled United Prairie
Bank to attorney’s fees if it instituted any collection action against
81
the Haugens and HNE. The personal guarantees also obligated
the Haugens and HNE to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and legal
expenses incurred by United Prairie Bank for the “protection,
defense or enforcement” of the personal guarantees in any
82
litigation, bankruptcy, or insolvency proceedings.
In December 2003, an action was brought against the
Haugens, HNE, the third party, and United Prairie Bank
L.L.C., 813 N.W.2d 49, 54–56 (Minn. 2012). In discussing this area of the law,
Rule 38.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure is also relevant. The Rule
states: “In actions for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal
property, the issues of fact shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a
reference is ordered.” Id. The rule appears in cases, but it has been interpreted in
a way that it does not have an impact on the right to a jury trial guaranteed by
article I, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution. See Olson, 628 N.W.2d at 154.
Specifically, the court has determined that Rule 38.01 “does not enlarge or
diminish the historical right.” Id. The sole issue of concern is whether the cause
of action is legal or equitable. Id.; see also 1A DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK,
MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED § 38.4 (5th ed. 2012).
77. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 52.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. Specifically, the promissory notes accompanying the loans obligated
the Haugens and HNE to pay attorney’s fees plus court costs if United Prairie
Bank hired an attorney to collect the debt. Id. The mortgage required them to
pay attorney’s fees and legal expenses in connection with any enforcement or
protection action with respect to the mortgage. Id. Finally, the commercial
security agreements obligated the Haugens and HNE to pay “reasonable attorneys’
fees and legal expenses” in connection with any action for the repossession of
secured property. Id.
82. Id.
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83

challenging these transactions as fraudulent transfers.
United
84
Prairie Bank defended and incurred $117,110.24 in legal fees. In
November 2004, United Prairie Bank notified the Haugens and
85
HNE that they were in default on their loan payments. United
Prairie Bank subsequently brought the action at issue to collect
86
amounts due under the agreement. It also brought forth breach
87
of contract claims for breach of the personal guaranties.” The
prayer for relief sought damages as well as reasonable attorney’s
88
fees and costs.
B.

Lower Court Decisions

At trial, the Haugens and HNE moved the court to have a jury
89
determine the amount of attorney’s fees owed. The court denied
90
the motion and awarded United Prairie Bank $403,821.82. The
Haugens and HNE appealed, but the Minnesota Court of Appeals
91
affirmed. In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals noted,
similar to prior decisions, that it could not identify authority from
92
1857 involving a cause of action for contractual attorney’s fees.
However, it followed the analysis outlined above and addressed
“whether ‘the nature and character of the controversy, as
determined from all the pleadings and by the relief sought[,]’
93
indicate[d] that ‘the cause of action [was] one at law today.’”
The Haugens and HNE argued that United Prairie Bank’s
94
claim was for breach of contract, which had already been
95
recognized as legal in nature. United Prairie Bank conceded that
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 53.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court found United Prairie Bank was entitled $286,711.58 in
attorney’s fees in the present action and an additional $117,110.24 in attorney’s
fees incurred by United Prairie Bank in defending the earlier lawsuit. Id.
91. Id.; see also United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition &
Equip., LLC, 782 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
92. See United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 270 (referring to cases such as
Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 2002) and Olson v.
Synergistic Technologies Business Systems, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 149 (Minn. 2001)).
93. Id. at 269 (quoting Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 349).
94. Id.
95. See Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 327, 126 N.W.2d 766, 768
(1965); Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Sur. of N.Y., 207 Minn. 117, 119,
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a breach of contract claim is legal in nature, but that its claim did
96
In
not implicate traditional breach of contract considerations.
resolving the dispute, the court of appeals looked to Minnesota
97
precedent, but also relied heavily on federal case law. Specifically,
the court applied the test used by the United States Supreme Court
98
in Ross v. Bernhard.
In Ross, the Court held that “[t]o determine whether a party is
entitled to a jury trial, . . . courts look to the ‘nature of the issue to
99
be tried rather than the character of the overall action.’”
A
conclusion is reached “by considering (1) how the issue was
customarily treated prior to the merger of the courts of law and
equity (the ‘pre-merger’ custom), (2) the remedy sought, and (3)
100
the abilities and limitations of juries.”
Examining these elements in turn, the court of appeals first
cited federal authority to support the conclusion that the premerger custom did not view a cause of action for contractual
101
attorney’s fees as legal in nature; rather, it was an issue typically
102
within the province of the trial court.
As to the remedy sought,
the court viewed United Prairie Bank’s action as one seeking
damages in connection with the defendant’s failure to pay amounts
103
due under the loan agreement.
The court concluded that the
issue of attorney’s fees was “collateral” to the underlying merits of
104
It essentially reasoned that
the breach of contract claim.
105
attorney’s fees are not damages as a direct result of the breach.
290 N.W. 231, 233 (1940).
96. United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 269.
97. Id. at 269–71.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 269 (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)).
100. Id. (citing Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10).
101. Id. at 269–70. To support this conclusion, the court of appeals relied on
Kudon v. f.m.e. Corp., 547 A.2d 976 (D.C. 1988) and Resolution Trust Co. v. Marshall,
939 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1991). Specifically, the Resolution Trust court held that
“[s]ince there is no common law right to recover attorneys fees, the Seventh
Amendment does not guarantee a trial by jury to determine the amount of
reasonable attorneys fees.” 939 F.2d at 279. However, as will be discussed in Part
IV.A, Minnesota has explicitly disagreed with this contention.
102. See United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 270.
103. See id.
104. Id. The court supported its “collateral” position by citing a federal district
court decision that held “the issues of liability for attorneys’ fees and the
reasonableness of any such award should be addressed separately from liability on
the merits.” Id. (quoting Redshaw Credit Corp. v. Diamond, 686 F. Supp. 674,
676–77 (E.D. Tenn. 1988)).
105. See id. at 271.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 11

258

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

With respect to the third factor, the abilities and limitations of
juries, the court found that requiring the trial court to decide the
amount of attorney’s fees owed was more practical and more
106
efficient than leaving it to a jury.
Considering these factors as a whole and taking into account
Minnesota precedent, the court of appeals drew a distinction
between a cause of action seeking attorney’s fees as a result of a
failure to provide a legal defense and a cause of action seeking
attorney’s fees in connection with the nonpayment of amounts due
107
under a promissory note. In the latter situation, which the court
concluded was the type before it, the issue of attorney’s fees was
108
ancillary to the merits of the underlying dispute.
The court
reasoned that because attorney’s fees were ancillary, the trial court
was in a better position to determine the amount of attorney’s fees
109
owed.
The Haugens and HNE appealed, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court granted review.
C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court

The sole issue before the Minnesota Supreme Court was
whether the Minnesota Constitution permitted a jury trial in an
action to recover attorney’s fees provided by contractual
110
It reversed the court of appeals and held that the
agreement.
Minnesota Constitution provided such a right because the recovery
111
of damages under a breach of contract claim is legal in nature.
The court reached this result using the Abraham two-pronged test
106. Id. at 270. In reaching this conclusion, the court found McGuire v. RussellMiller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306 (2d Cir. 1993) particularly persuasive. United Prairie Bank,
782 N.W.2d at 271. See Part IV.B for a thorough discussion of the practical
abilities and limitations of juries.
107. See United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 271.
108. See id. The juxtaposition of these claims was based on the remedy sought.
For the court of appeals, the failure to provide a legal defense was a breach of an
obligation to reimburse, which entitled a party to attorney’s fees as damages
incurred. However, in an action to collect amounts due under a promissory note,
the remedy was damages in the amount of the uncollected debt—attorney’s fees
provided only “collateral” relief. As will be discussed, this reasoning misconstrues
basic contract law. See infra Part IV.A; Part IV.B (discussing why courts err in
drawing this distinction).
109. See United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 271. For the court of appeals, this
also meant that trial courts were required to determine whether a party was
entitled to recover attorney’s fees in the first place. See id.
110. United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC,
813 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Minn. 2012).
111. See id. at 52.
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discussed above; it addressed the substantive nature of a
112
contractual attorney’s fees action as well as the remedy sought.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, like the court of appeals,
could not identify authority from 1857 involving a cause of action
113
for contractual attorney’s fees. However, the court cited case law
114
involving this type of action as early as 1863.
The court
connected this early authority with the situation in United Prairie
Bank because the underlying theme in both was “contractual
115
indemnity.”
The court considered contractual indemnity an
action “at law” because, like a simple breach of contract claim, it
was an action for the “recovery of money based upon the promise
116
117
to pay,” which had already been recognized as legal in nature.
The court then turned to the second prong: the nature of the
118
It determined the claim for attorney’s fees was
remedy sought.
119
one seeking damages for the breach of the loan agreements. To
support this position, the court found New Amsterdam, which
involved a contractual indemnity action, particularly persuasive, as
that court did not differentiate attorney’s fees from other issues
that were submitted to the jury—each involved “the recovery of
120
money.” The court bolstered this analysis by citing decisions that
had found the recovery of money under ordinary breach of
121
contract actions legal in nature.
The court concluded that
112. Id. at 54–58; see supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. In applying
the Abraham two-pronged test, the court rejected the Ross test adopted by the court
of appeals. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 60; see also infra Part IV.B.
113. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 54–55; supra note 92 and accompanying
text.
114. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 54--55 (referring to Griswold v. Taylor,
8 Minn. 342 (1863)). See infra note 134 for a further discussion of Griswold.
115. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 55.
116. Id. at 55–56.
117. Id. at 56; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Lundquist, 293 Minn. 274, 287, 198
N.W.2d 543, 551 (1972) (“An action based on an indemnity agreement is for the
recovery of money based upon the promise to pay and is therefore triable by a
jury.”); Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 207 Minn. 117, 119,
290 N.W. 231, 233 (1940) (“A suit against a surety on the contract is an action for
the recovery of money based upon the promise to pay. Therefore it is triable by
jury.”); Pierce v. Maetzold, 126 Minn. 445, 451, 148 N.W. 302, 304 (1914).
118. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 56.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 57. The court’s use of traditional breach of contract cases includes
Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963), which involved an action to determine
the amount of fees due under a contingent fee retainer contract; Landgraf v.
Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 324–26, 126 N.W.2d 766, 767–68 (1964), which involved
an action to recover commissions due under a contract; and Raymond Farmers

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 11

260

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

because the claim was seeking money damages, the analysis was
122
complete.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached the correct result in
United Prairie Bank.
As stated, the court’s analysis is not
controversial. However, the opportunity to reach a different result
was certainly present. The court seemed cognizant of this fact as it
123
rejected, at length, other theories advanced. The court chose the
historical and textual analysis as opposed to the one that might
124
have been more practical. As will be discussed, this was proper in
125
light of precedent and basic logic.
126
This section begins with a critique of the court’s analysis.
Particularly, it focuses on how the court addressed the nature and
127
character of the controversy as well as the remedy sought. It then
turns to a discussion as to why the court correctly rejected other
128
theories advanced, notably the third Ross factor.
It concludes
with an examination of how Minnesota creditors can protect
129
themselves moving forward.
A.

Correctly Concluding that the Nature and Character of the Controversy
and the Remedy Sought are Legal in Nature

Analyzing first the nature and character of the controversy, the
court correctly noted that it cannot cite authority from 1857
130
involving a cause of action for contractual attorney’s fees.
However, prior decisions have expressly stated “[t]he constitution is
131
and precedent permits an
not frozen in time in 1857”
examination of whether the type of action permitted a jury trial
Elevator Co., 207 Minn. at 119, 290 N.W. at 233, which involved an action against a
surety seeking damages for losses stemming from an employee’s fraudulent
conduct.
122. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 57.
123. See id. at 58–63.
124. Leventhal, supra note 9.
125. See infra Part IV.A–B.
126. See infra Part IV.A.
127. See infra Part IV.A.
128. See infra Part IV.B.
129. See infra Part IV.C–D.
130. See United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip.,
LLC, 813 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2012).
131. Abraham v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. 2002).
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132

when the Minnesota Constitution was adopted.
The type of action at issue in United Prairie Bank is one for
133
contractual indemnity.
As stated, the court first recognized the
134
validity of this type of provision in 1863 in Griswold. In that case,
the issue of whether the cause of action was legal or equitable was
135
not before the court.
However, later decisions have provided
clarity, stating definitively that a contractual indemnity claim is an
136
action at law.
132. Id.; Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 148–49
(Minn. 2001).
133. See BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (3d. ed. 1969) (stating an
indemnity contract is “[a] contract whereby one agrees to save another from the
legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties or of some other person.”);
1 DOBBS, supra note 6, § 3.10(3), at 402–03; 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes; Letters of Credit
§ 98 (2012) (stating the issue of attorney’s fees pursuant to a promissory note
obligating a debtor to pay a creditor’s attorney’s fees in the event of the debtor’s
default involves many considerations, including “recognition of the fact that an
agreement to pay an attorney’s fee is a contract of indemnification.”); 42 C.J.S.
Indemnity § 1 (2012) (“An agreement to indemnify another is an agreement . . . in
which the indemnitor promises to reimburse his or her indemnitee for loss
suffered.”). In this case, the Haugens and HNE agreed, inter alia, to indemnify
United Prairie Bank for any attorney’s fees incurred in the protection or
enforcement of their debt obligation. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 51.
134. See Griswold v. Taylor, 8 Minn. 342, 344–45 (1863). Similar to United
Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 51, the contract at issue in Griswold provided for
attorney’s fees in the event the lender brought a foreclosure action. Griswold, 8
Minn. at 342–43. In upholding the contract, the court found the provision was “a
stipulation [to] save the mortgagee harmless in the event of a forced collection[.]”
Id. at 344. While the term was not actually used, it is clear that this is an indemnity
contract. See supra note 133.
135. See generally Griswold, 8 Minn. 342.
136. See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Lundquist, 293 Minn. 274, 287, 198
N.W.2d 543, 551 (1972) (“An action based on an indemnity agreement is for the
recovery of money based upon the promise to pay and is therefore triable by a
jury.”); Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 207 Minn. 117, 119,
290 N.W. 231, 233 (1940) (“A suit against a surety on the contract is an action for
the recovery of money based upon the promise to pay. Therefore it is triable by
jury.”); Pierce v. Maetzold, 126 Minn. 445, 451, 148 N.W. 302, 304 (1914). While
Minnesota has been unwavering in its view that contractual indemnity actions are
legal in nature, the Minnesota Supreme Court does not appear to have addressed
its substantive origins. See generally New Amsterdam, 293 Minn. at 287, 198 N.W.2d at
551; Raymond, 207 Minn. at 119, 290 N.W. at 233; Pierce, 126 Minn. at 451, 148
N.W. at 304. A review of Minnesota case law suggests that the issue was first
addressed in Pierce. See 126 Minn. at 451, 148 N.W. at 304. While that court made
conclusive statements that the action was legal in nature, it did not cite authority
to support its position. See id. Later decisions have provided additional support
for the proposition but have not expanded on the reasoning. See generally New
Amsterdam, 293 Minn. at 287, 198 N.W.2d at 551; Raymond, 207 Minn. at 119, 290
N.W. at 233. Federal authority has provided some guidance, finding that “it would
be difficult to conceive of an action of a more traditionally legal character” than

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 11

262

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

After considering the nature and character of the controversy,
137
In United Prairie Bank,
the court turned to the remedy sought.
138
the remedy was attorney’s fees, which can, in this case, be
139
properly characterized as money damages pursuant to a contract.
In this context, the court correctly concluded that the remedy is
legal in nature.
Analysis of the damages at issue in United Prairie Bank involves
an examination of basic contract law—specifically, expectation
140
damages.
“Expectation damages attempt to provide the nonbreaching party with the expected benefit of the contract, also
141
To recover expectation
known as the benefit of the bargain.”
damages, a party is required to show that the damages were
142
foreseeable at the time of contract formation.
The issue of
foreseeability has its roots in the famous English case Hadley v.
143
144
Baxendale, which Minnesota expressly recognizes.
That case
145
The
provided two basic rules governing expectation damages.
non-breaching party should receive damages that may reasonably
be considered as arising naturally from a breach of contract or
those damages that may reasonably “have been in the
“an action on a debt allegedly due under a contract.” Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962). The result is that the substantive origins of a contractual
indemnity action are somewhat vague. However, precedent clearly states that the
nature and character of a contractual indemnity action is legal in nature.
137. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 56.
138. Id. at 53.
139. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 3.10(1), at 389 (recognizing that contractual
attorney’s fees serve several different purposes, one of which is damages pursuant
to a contract—the policy behind the fees as damages rationale is that without the
ability to recover the fees, the aggrieved plaintiff is not made whole); 1 ROBERT L.
ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 8.4 (3d ed. 2011) (“In actions involving indemnity,
brought where the duty to indemnify is either implied by law or arises under a
contract, reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in resisting the claim indemnified
against may be recovered as part of the damages and expenses, since they are
foreseeable consequences of the indemnitor’s wrongful conduct.” (footnote
omitted)). Contra id. (recognizing there is some authority to the contrary).
140. See 20 BRENT A. OLSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK,
FORMATION AND OPERATION OF BUSINESSES § 7.41 (2011) (noting that an award of
expectation damages is one of the primary remedies for breach of contract).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 7.42. The converse is also true. Namely, a party not “liable in the
event of a breach for the loss that he did not at the time of contracting have
reason to foresee as a probable result of such a breach.” Id.
143. Id.
144. Lassen v. First Bank Eden Prairie, 514 N.W.2d 831, 838 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 154 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.)).
145. 20 OLSON, supra note 140, § 7.42.
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contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract,
146
The former are categorized
as the probable result of a breach.”
as “general” damages while the latter are referred to as either
147
“special” or “consequential” damages.
The damages sought in United Prairie Bank were general
damages. “General damages are [those] that are the obvious result
of the breach of contract, or those that occur in the ordinary
148
The policy rationale behind general damages
course of events.”
is that “the plaintiff should be awarded the value of the very thing
149
promised.” In United Prairie Bank, the contract made clear that if
an action was brought or defended, part of the remedy would be
150
attorney’s fees.
This provision was bargained for, and attorney’s
151
fees as damages arose naturally from any breach. Therefore, the
remedy is money damages pursuant to a contract. Minnesota has
152
made it clear that this type of remedy is legal in nature.
While the issue is fairly well settled, it must be noted that there
is some Minnesota authority suggesting that in an action seeking a
default judgment, the award of attorney’s fees is collateral to the
underlying merits. Specifically, in First State Bank of Grand Rapids v.
Cohasset Wooden Ware Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
an attorney’s fees provision in a default action under a promissory
153
note “is not a distinct cause of action.”
Similarly, in Campbell v.
Worman, the court described attorney’s fees as not “part of the
154
original debt.”
However, as stated by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in United Prairie Bank, these propositions “[are] contrary to
155
The payment of attorney’s fees arises
basic contract law.”
naturally from any breach of the loan documents. The attorney’s
fees provisions were presumably bargained for to ensure
146. Id. (citing Hadley, 154 Eng. Rep. 145).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 3 DOBBS, supra note 6, § 12.2(3), at 41.
150. United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC,
813 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn. 2012).
151. See id.
152. Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 327, 126 N.W.2d 766, 768 (1964)
(finding a suit for the recovery of money pursuant to a contract dispute was legal
in nature); Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Surety Co. of N.Y., 207 Minn.
117, 119, 290 N.W. 231, 233 (1940) (finding that a suit against a surety on a
contract seeks money damages and was therefore legal in nature).
153. 136 Minn. 103, 105, 161 N.W. 398, 399 (1917).
154. 58 Minn. 561, 564, 60 N.W. 668, 669 (1894).
155. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 59; see also id. at 62 n.7 (explicitly
criticizing First State Bank of Grand Rapids and Worman).
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156

compliance with the loan agreement.
In the event of a breach,
157
the remedy clearly included collecting attorney’s fees incurred.
In essence, the provision was bargained for to put United Prairie
Bank in the same position it would have been in had no
158
misconduct occurred.
First State Bank of Grand Rapids and
Worman are also concerning because they failed to take into
account precedent on point. Specifically, in Jones v. Radatz, the
Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly stated:
The suggestion . . . that a stipulation to pay attorney’s fees
in case of suit relates merely to the remedy, is not sound.
For the payee, if he recover[s] on that part of the
promise, must recover, not because he is obliged to bring
suit, but because it is part of the contract and obligation
of the maker, on which the suit is brought, that he will pay
159
them upon the specified contingency.
Therefore, the court in United Prairie Bank properly distinguished
cases advancing the “collateral” position and determined that the
remedy sought was money damages pursuant to a contract.
B.

Rejecting the Third Ross Factor

In reaching its conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court also
correctly rejected the third Ross factor to determine whether a
cause of action is legal or equitable. The factor, used by the court
of appeals in United Prairie Bank, had its genesis in a footnote in the
160
United States Supreme Court decision Ross v. Bernhard.
Specifically, the note stated: “As our cases indicate, the ‘legal’
nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the premerger custom with reference to such questions; second, the
remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of
161
juries.”
It should be apparent that the first two factors are nearly

156. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 3.10(3), at 401–02 (stating that attorney’s fees
pursuant to an indemnity agreement serve a dual purpose: they sanction “some
particular misbehavior [of the defendant] while at the same time compensating
the plaintiff”).
157. See 20 OLSON, supra note 140, § 7.41.
158. Id. (“Expectation damages attempt to provide the non-breaching party
with the expected benefit of the contract, also known as the ‘benefit of the
bargain.’”).
159. 27 Minn. 240, 242, 6 N.W. 800, 800 (1880).
160. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
161. Id. (emphasis added).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/11

20

Borgen: Civil Procedure: The Civil Right to a Jury Trial and What it Mean

2012]

CIVIL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

265

162

identical to the Abraham two-pronged test.
However, the third
factor prompts an interesting discussion.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has never expressly adopted
163
the third Ross factor.
The court of appeals made an attempt in
164
United Prairie Bank, but the Minnesota Supreme Court quickly
rejected its application, finding the United States Supreme Court
has limited its use “to a narrow set of circumstances that are
165
inapplicable here.”
This assertion is correct. The United States
Supreme Court has stated the third Ross factor “is relevant only to
the determination [of] whether Congress has permissibly entrusted
the resolution of certain disputes to an administrative agency or
specialized court of equity, and whether jury trials would impair the
166
functioning of the legislative scheme.”
It is quite clear that a
cause of action for contractual attorney’s fees does not implicate
these considerations.
However, while the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the
third Ross factor, it must be clearly stated that the court had the
opportunity to consider it for three reasons. First, although the
court has never expressly adopted the third Ross factor, it has, at
least once, considered the practical abilities and limitations of
167
juries in analyzing whether a claim was legal or equitable.
Thus,
the court had at least some basis for adopting the third Ross factor.
Second, the Seventh Amendment is not incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
168
Constitution.
Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court was not
bound by the United States Supreme Court’s narrow application.
Third, even though the Minnesota Supreme Court was not bound
by federal precedent, if the court wanted to adopt the third Ross
162. See Abraham v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. 2002);
supra Part IV.A.
163. United Prairie Bank–Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC,
813 N.W.2d 49, 60 (Minn. 2012).
164. United Prairie Bank–Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC,
782 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
165. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 60 (referencing Chauffeurs, Teamsters
& Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990)).
166. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 494 U.S. at 565 n.4 (citation omitted).
167. E.g., Georgopolis v. George, 237 Minn. 176, 186, 54 N.W.2d 137, 143
(1952) (“[T]he transactions testified to were so detailed and so many documents
were introduced in evidence that decisions on the proposed questions would have
been very difficult for a jury.”). While this language is used in the decision, the
Minnesota Supreme Court makes it clear that the cause of action is equitable in
nature. Id.
168. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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factor, it could have looked to federal decisions applying it for
persuasive support. For example, in McGuire v. Russell-Miller, Inc.,
which is factually similar to United Prairie Bank, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals relied heavily on the practical abilities and
limitations of juries in determining whether a cause of action was
169
legal or equitable. The result of these three considerations is that
the Minnesota Supreme Court had the opportunity to adopt the
third Ross factor. As stated, the court rejected the factor on the
grounds that the United States Supreme Court has limited its
170
application.
However, a detailed analysis of the reasoning
advanced in support of the third Ross factor, most notably as
explained in McGuire v. Russell-Miller, shows it is flawed.
Minnesota’s rejection of the factor was correct, even if the court
did so for a different reason.
Similar to United Prairie Bank, McGuire v. Russell-Miller
addressed a contractual indemnity action involving attorney’s
171
fees.
The relevant contractual provision was breached, and the
issue became whether the trial court should have submitted the
172
issue of attorney’s fees to the jury. The court acknowledged that
173
and
the matter was one of first impression for the circuit
ultimately adopted a bifurcated approach: the question of liability
for attorney’s fees should be submitted to the jury, but the question
as to the amount of attorney’s fees owed was a matter properly
174
resolved by the trial court.
In reaching its conclusion with respect to the amount of
attorney’s fees owed, the McGuire court made the bald assertion
that determining the amount of attorney’s fees, in this situation,
involved equitable issues of accounting, which is not a legal

169. 1 F.3d 1306, 1315–16 (2d Cir. 1993). What is interesting about McGuire is
that it was decided less than five years after the court narrowed the third Ross
factor’s applicability. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 494 U.S. at 565 n.4;
Granfinciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989). Whether this was
proper in light of prior precedent is certainly debatable. However, because
Minnesota is not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation, it
could have used McGuire as a basis for adopting the third Ross factor.
170. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 60.
171. McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1309. Specifically, that court addressed a contract that
provided attorney’s fees to the plaintiff in the event it brought an action against
the defendant for breach of any warranty or representation made in connection
with the agreement. Id.
172. Id. at 1310.
173. Id. at 1313.
174. Id.
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175

remedy. The court also stated that the issue as to the amount of
176
While
attorney’s fees was collateral to the underlying merits.
these contentions are advanced, both the majority and concurring
opinions relied heavily on the third Ross factor, the practical
abilities and limitations of juries, to find the bifurcated approach is
the proper way to resolve the case.
The McGuire court appeared troubled by the notion of
allowing a jury to decide the amount of attorney’s fees owed. The
majority stated:
To compute a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees in a
particular case requires more than simply a report of the
number of hours spent and the hourly rate. The
calculation depends on an assessment of whether those
statistics are reasonable, based on, among other things,
the time and labor reasonably required by the case, the
skill demanded by the novelty or complexity of the issues,
the burdensomeness of the fees, the incentive effects on
177
future cases, and the fairness to the parties.
Judge Jacobs, in his concurrence, was concerned about whether a
jury could focus on the underlying merits of the claim when it was
also considering the issue of reasonable attorney’s fees. Judge
Jacobs concluded:
For jurors, the attorney’s fee issue will almost always be a
different and disconcerting way of looking at the merits.
Prevailing counsel should not have to disclose to the jury
the need for in limine motions, the protective efforts
employed in discovery, the pursuit of settlement, or the
toil and calculation required to build a case that may have
been promoted to the same jury as simple or self178
evident.
After finding the practical abilities and limitations of juries were
significant enough to remove the issue from their consideration,
179
The
the court stated that adopting this approach is “efficient.”
court concluded that “[j]udges are better equipped than juries to
make computations based on details about billing practices,

175. See id. at 1314.
176. Id. at 1315.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1317 (Jacobs, J., concurring); see also Gene F. Zipperle, Jr. &
Timothy D. Martin, Rolling the Dice: Jury Trials—Reasonable Attorney’s fees And
Expenses, FOR DEF., Mar. 2008, at 26.
179. McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1316 (majority opinion).
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including rates and hours charged on a particular case.” For the
McGuire court, the converse was also true in that requiring juries to
181
make this determination would needlessly increase fees.
Finally,
the court in McGuire reasoned that leaving the amount of attorney’s
fees to the jury would require the jurors to keep accurate totals
throughout the trial, whereas the judge could make this
182
determination with “perfect hindsight.”
While the McGuire reasoning seems persuasive on its face, its
logic falls apart when considering a “free-standing” action for
contractual attorney’s fees. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
183
recognized this distinction in J.R. Simplot v. Chevron Pipeline Co. In
Simplot, the parties entered into an agreement for Simplot to
184
purchase a pipeline from Chevron. The agreement was complex,
but it provided a provision that Chevron would hold Simplot
185
harmless in any pre-closing action against the pipeline.
Simplot
defended a pre-closing action and notified Chevron of its
186
Chevron refused and
contractual obligation to reimburse.
187
Simplot brought the action at issue. At trial, Chevron moved the
188
court to have a jury determine the amount of fees to be awarded.
The trial court denied the request and awarded Simplot attorney’s
189
fees.
On appeal, the court began its analysis by noting the
posture of the case—the action was for the breach of a promise to
190
The
reimburse, i.e., a straightforward breach of contract claim.
180. Id.
181. Id. (“[I]f the parties submitted evidence of the amount of attorneys’ fees
to a jury at trial, the time spent acculturating the jury to the mysteries of attorneys’
hourly rates and incidental charges, and cross-examining about those matters,
would likely increase fees and generate inconsistent awards.”).
182. Id.
183. 563 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 2009).
184. Id. at 1106.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1107.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1108.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1116. The court noted that the present dispute was more “like an
insurance case where the insurer has breached its duty to defend a lawsuit against
the insured by a third party and the insured sues the insurer for payment of the
costs of its defense, particularly attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 1117. A “free-standing”
cause of action for contractual attorney’s fees was also at issue in United Prairie
Bank; however, the court did not recognize it. This second cause of action arose
because the loan documents required the Haugens and HNE to pay all costs and
expenses incurred in defending the loan agreements. United Prairie BankMountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 813 N.W.2d 49, 51–52 (Minn.
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court then distinguished the situation in McGuire, simply stating
191
that it did not involve a “free-standing” attorney’s fees claim.
The court in Simplot distinguished McGuire, but what it should
have done is point out the inconsistency that results in nearly
identical situations. That inconsistency is essentially that a jury is
not capable of awarding attorney’s fees in a case involving a default
action under a loan agreement, but it is capable when addressing a
“free-standing” contractual attorney’s fees claim. The court in
McGuire correctly noted that “[t]o compute a reasonable amount of
attorneys’ fees in a particular case requires more than simply a
192
report of the number of hours spent and the hourly rate.”
However, to say that a jury is competent to handle this task in one
situation but not the other defies logic. The only difference is the
timing of when the jury actually hears the issue. The same goes for
the argument that “the attorney’s fee issue will almost always be a
193
different and disconcerting way of looking at the merits.” In fact,
there are a number of occurrences during the course of a trial that
might result in the jury having a favorable or unfavorable view of
the underlying merits, but that has always been a consideration
194
with jury trials.
The McGuire reasoning simply does not wash
when considering the entire spectrum of situations where a jury
might need to decide both liability for and the amount of
attorney’s fees due. Once past this issue, the court in McGuire

2012). This provision was breached when United Prairie Bank defended the
earlier action and was not reimbursed. Id. at 52. Thus, United Prairie Bank had a
separate, “free-standing,” cause of action for breach of contract. The Abraham twopronged test once again applies, and it is clear that a “free-standing” breach of
contract claim is legal in nature. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477
(1962) (“As an action on a debt allegedly due under a contract, it would be
difficult to conceive of an action of a more traditionally legal character.”); J.R.
Simplot, 563 F.3d at 1116. The decision not to address the “free-standing” claim
does not change the analysis, but it is worthwhile to point out. In considering this
issue, Simplot is discussed because that court’s analysis is more robust.
191. J.R. Simplot, 563 F.3d at 1116–17 (citing McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc., 1
F.3d 1306 (2d Cir. 1993)).
192. McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1315.
193. Id. at 1317 (Jacobs, J., concurring).
194. See Scott Kitner, Note, The Need and Means to Restrict Spectators from Wearing
Buttons at Criminal Trials, 27 REV. LITIG. 733, 768 (2008) (arguing that allowing
spectators to wear lapel buttons in the courtroom during trials allows the jury to
decide guilt on the basis of issues outside the merits of the prosecution’s case); see
also Sierra Elizabeth, Note, The Newest Spectator Sport: Why Extending Victims’ Rights to
the Spectators’ Gallery Erodes the Presumption of Innocence, 58 DUKE L.J. 275, 308–09
(2008).
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195

resorts to an efficiency argument.
However, in this country, we
have a strong tradition of supporting the constitutional right to a
196
jury trial, even though other procedures might be more efficient.
What the Simplot analysis recognized is that a “free-standing”
claim for contractual attorney’s fees is one of the most traditional
legal claims imaginable. The court in Simplot was aware that to take
the issue away from the jury would have been to fly in the face of
197
Analyzing a “free-standing”
hundreds of years of precedent.
contractual attorney’s fees action, such as the one in Simplot, sheds
light on why the court in United Prairie Bank correctly rejected the
198
third Ross factor, even if it did so for a different reason. To do so
199
might have been more efficient, but not constitutionally sound.
195. McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1316 (majority opinion).
196. See Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873) (“It is assumed
that twelve men [and women] know more of the common affairs of life than does
one man [or woman], that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from
admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.”); Jefferson Nat’l Bank v.
Cent. Nat’l Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1983) (“In close cases where there
is a doubt . . . the court should favor of [sic] the granting of a jury trial to insure
[sic] constitutional rights.” (quoting Dixon v. Nw. Nat’l Bank, 297 F. Supp. 485,
489 (D. Minn. 1969))); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961), available at http://www.constitution.org
/fed/federa83.htm (“The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if
they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by
jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very
palladium of free government.”).
197. The inference that the court is cognizant that a breach of contract claim
is a straightforward legal issue comes from the fact that after stating this general
proposition, the court supports it with a long string cite of cases recognizing the
proposition. See J.R. Simplot v Chevron Pipeline Co., 563 F.3d 1102, 1115 (10th Cir.
2009). It may be a stretch to assume that the court realized that to take this issue
away from the jury would not comport with established precedent but, given the
context of the case, the inference can be made.
198. As stated above, the reason is that the United States Supreme Court has
limited the third Ross factor “to a narrow set of circumstances that are inapplicable
here.” United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC,
813 N.W.2d 49, 60 (Minn. 2012). The United States Supreme Court has stated
that the third Ross factor “is relevant only to the determination whether Congress
has permissibly entrusted the resolution of certain disputes to an administrative
agency or specialized court of equity, and whether jury trials would impair the
functioning of the legislative scheme.” Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local
No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).
199. Beyond what has been already stated, the third Ross factor has been
criticized on other grounds as well. Notably, Minnesota legal scholar Charles W.
Wolfram challenged the United States Supreme Court’s adoption of the third Ross
factor, stating:
Several difficulties with such a functional approach are apparent. First,
no one has successfully isolated those functions which the jury is
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Given that the court reached the correct decision in light of its
article I, section 4 precedent, the question becomes, what does this
mean for Minnesota creditors moving forward?
C.

The Hometown Jury: A Warning to Minnesota Creditors Seeking
Contractual Attorney’s Fees

The result reached in United Prairie Bank should caution
creditors, as it is now clear that a party can unilaterally request a
jury trial in any action involving the recovery of contractual
200
The concern for creditors should be made
attorney’s fees.
apparent by the opening two paragraphs of the Haugens’ and
HNE’s brief filed with the Minnesota Supreme Court, which states:
The tragedy which has befallen the Haugens and their
family in this case is largely a function of out-of-control
attorneys’ fees.
Because the notes, mortgages and
guarantees signed by Leland Haugen, Iene [sic] Haugen,
Haugen Nutrition and Equipment, Inc., and other entities
belong to or controlled by Leland and Ilene Haugen
contained clauses permitting United Prairie Bank to
charge costs of collection and reasonable attorneys’ fees,
UPB took advantage. While the Haugens could have paid
off their obligations absent the huge amount awarded
UPB in attorneys fees, the size of this award has made it
impossible for them to do so.
As the District Court’s analysis of its attorney fee
award indicates, the ultimate amount of that award is
subjective. A rural jury, while it would certainly have
upheld the clear and legitimate costs a bank might have
incurred in enforcing a debt on a farm, is unlikely to have
been as generous in an area as subjective and nebulous as a
supposed to perform under the [S]eventh [A]mendment, at least not to
the satisfaction of any substantial audience. Second, to the extent that
such an approach would be used both to expand and to contract the jury
trial right, the functional approach might be thought to raise the spectre
of federal judges using a disturbingly broad discretion in their
determination of whether a jury ought to be interposed in particular
cases. Finally, it seems clear that one of the purposes of the right of jury
trial in civil cases is to place limitations upon judges. It thus might be
thought to be particularly inappropriate in this instance for federal
courts to claim a broad and loosely structured power to determine
whether this civilian check on their own functioning should be
interposed.
Wolfram, supra note 15, at 644.
200. See United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 51.
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determination of attorneys’ fees. Indeed, the failure of the
District Court to permit a jury determination of this issue
is the single most important factor in the size of the award
201
to UPB.
What should be most concerning to creditors about these
statements is that it appears the Haugens’ and HNE’s goal in this
litigation was to get the matter before a “rural jury” who, at least
from their perspective, would not award the amount of attorney’s
fees due because of the hardship that has befallen them. It is
alarming because the statement, which is unsupported by any legal
authority whatsoever, is essentially advocating for a hometown jury
to find in favor of a hometown debtor. The trial strategy would
likely play out along the same lines, with the defendants attempting
to portray the plaintiff as running up its fees simply because it
202
can. It is debatable whether this strategy would be effective, but it
is certainly concerning that the Haugens and HNE would state
their presumable goal so boldly. The concern for creditors should
be the possibility of being faced with a similar situation.
In light of the result reached in United Prairie Bank, how should
Minnesota creditors who want to collect attorney’s fees for the
protection or enforcement of a security interest proceed?
D.

Reasonable Attorney’s Fees with a Twist: Agreeing to a Court Trial

Despite the decision in United Prairie Bank, provisions allowing
creditors to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the protection of
a security interest or enforcement of amounts due under a loan
agreement are still desirable; it allows creditors to be reimbursed
for costs incurred for “enforcing a legal right against a debtor who,
203
by his [or her] own default, obliges the creditor to act.”
204
Moreover, while attorney’s fees are limited to what is reasonable,
201. Appellants’ Brief & Appendix at 7–8, United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 49
(No. A09-0607) (emphasis added).
202. United Prairie Bank’s brief is critical of the contention that it
unnecessarily ran up attorney’s fees. See Respondent’s Brief & Appendix at 39–40,
United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 49 (No. A09-0607). Specifically, it points out
that the Haugens and HNE vigorously defended the collection action. Id. As a
result of this defense, United Prairie Bank incurred substantial attorney’s fees
litigating various matters in order to obtain its lower court victories. Id.
203. Comment, Stipulations for Attorney’s Fees, 37 YALE L.J. 490, 491 (1928).
204. ROSSI, supra note 139, § 9:39. The amount of reasonable attorney’s fees
generally depends on a number of considerations, including “the amount in
controversy, the number and seriousness of the questions involved, the difficulties
encountered in prosecuting the action, as well as time and labor employed.” Id.
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these provisions allow a party to recover all reasonable attorney’s
fees incurred—the benefit obviously being that predicting which
agreements might result in complex litigation, such as that in
205
United Prairie Bank, is difficult, to say the least.
With that said,
creditors in Minnesota would be well served, when including
provisions seeking reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with
the protection of security interests or in actions for the
enforcement of obligations to pay amounts due, to also include a
provision in the agreement for a court trial in any action contesting
206
the amount of attorney’s fees owed.
This measure allows
creditors not only to obtain all reasonable fees but also protects
against the possibility that a jury might improperly award attorney’s
207
fees owed pursuant to the contract. To protect clients’ interests,

205. The situation presented in United Prairie Bank presents a nice illustration
of why liquidated damages can be a problem for creditors seeking to be
reimbursed for attorney’s fees. Liquidated damages are efficient because the
remedy is predictable in the event of a breach. OLSON, supra note 140, § 7.45.
However, in situations such as United Prairie Bank, where the trial court determined
that United Prairie Bank was entitled to $403,821.82, it is unlikely that a liquidated
damages provision would provide a creditor adequate relief. The converse is
obviously also true: in some actions, liquidated damages would result in a windfall
to creditors. However, in considering the potential windfall, it must be cautioned
that “[i]f the liquidated damages clause provides for an amount of damages that
are grossly disproportionate to the damages actually incurred, the clause will be
held unenforceable, even if at the time the clause was inserted into the contract it
appeared to be a reasonable estimation of damages.” Id. Therefore, reasonable
attorney fee provisions are the desirable approach.
206. 33 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 77:128 (Lawyers Ed. 2012) (“There is no abstract
public policy against contractual waiver of the right to civil jury trial. Agreements
waiving the right to trial by jury are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy.
Parties to a contract may by a prior written agreement, which is knowingly and
voluntarily entered, execute a waiver to the right to jury trial. A contract
provision—made independently of litigation—for waiver of a jury trial is
enforceable, but it is strictly and narrowly construed.” (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted)). See generally Hoene v. Jamieson, 289 Minn. 1, 7, 182 N.W.2d
834, 838 (1970) (recognizing that stipulations that only affect legal rights may be
effective, but that stipulations regarding matters of law are not binding on the
court); 4 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8:50 (4th ed. 2012); 23
RONALD I. MESHBESHER, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR MINNESOTA
LAWYERS § 2.27 (2011) (citing Lane v. Lenfest, 40 Minn. 375, 376, 42 N.W. 84, 85
(1889) (recognizing the validity of stipulations that certain issues be decided by
the court in Minnesota)).
207. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[J]urors are not infallible guardians of the public
good. They are ordinary citizens whose decisions can be shaped by influences
impermissible in our system of justice.”).
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specifically the costs incurred by those clients, attorneys drafting
attorney’s fees provisions in loan documents would be well served
to consider this option in light of United Prairie Bank.
V. CONCLUSION
In United Prairie Bank, the Minnesota Supreme Court must be
commended for reaching the correct result in light of its article I,
section 4 jurisprudence. The court correctly analyzed the nature
and character of the controversy as well as the remedy sought to
properly determine that a cause of action for contractual attorney’s
fees pursuant to an indemnity contract is legal in nature. While the
court did not totally refute analysis advanced by other jurisdictions,
such reasoning was not advanced in Minnesota.
However, creditors should be cautious moving forward.
Attorneys drafting loan agreements should consider the events that
unfolded in United Prairie Bank. Most significantly, it appears that
some debtors believe they can have success litigating the amount of
attorney’s fees in front of a jury. It is unclear whether the strategy
will be successful, but it appears to be wise to avoid this possibility.
Attorneys drafting loan agreements should pay close attention to
the result reached in United Prairie Bank and strongly consider
including provisions in indemnity agreements stating the court, and
not a jury, shall resolve attorney fee disputes.
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